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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 
U. C. A. §78-2a-3(2) (k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This is a subrogation action brought by State Farm Insurance 
in the name of its insured, GNS Partnership. 
1. The trial court properly concluded that where the dorm 
contract was silent on the issue of insurance, it was presumed that 
the landlord (GNS) would provide fire insurance for the benefit of 
the tenant (Fullmer) and GNS and that Fullmer was an implied co-
insured for the limited purpose of subrogation. 
Standard of Review; This case was decided on summary 
judgment. The trial court's conclusions of law are subject to 
review for correctness. Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 201 
U. A. R. 21 (Utah 1992). 
2. The trial court ruled correctly on State Farm' s motion to 
strike the affidavit of Brad Fullmer. 
Standard of Review: The trial court' s rulings are mixed 
issues of law and fact, and are reviewable for correctness. 
Maraulies bv Maraulies v. Unchurch, 696 P. 2d 1195 (Utah 1985). 
3. The trial court properly denied State Farm' s Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. At a minimum, there were fact issues 
which would have precluded summary judgment in favor of State Farm. 
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Standard of Review: In order to rule in favor of State Farm, 
the trial court would have been required to ignore the conduct of 
the parties and rules of construction applicable to the dorm 
contract. There was either no evidence to warrant such disregard 
by the Court, or at a minimum, the parties' conduct would have 
created issues of fact. The trial court1 s conclusions of law are 
subject to review for correctness. Retherford, supra. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES M P RULES 
The trial court' s judgment was entered pursuant to Rule 56, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, no statute or rule is 
determinative of the issues before this court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a subrogation action commenced by State Farm in the 
name of its insured against Brad Fullmer. At the time of the fire 
which gave rise to the claim, Brad Fullmer was a 20-year old 
college student at Dixie College residing in off campus student 
housing, The Wedge Apartments. (R. 144) 
Shortly after Fullmer became a resident in the student 
housing, he used a charcoal grill on a balcony at the apartment. 
Many hours after the grill had been used, Fullmer deposited the 
ashes in a cardboard box and put them in a storage closet also on 
the balcony. During the night, a fire developed causing 
approximately $70,000.00 in damage. (R. 51, 52, 224, 225) 
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The dorm contract did not require Fullmer to procure insurance 
for the property. The dorm contract did not address insurance. 
(R. 147) Fullmer expected that the landlord would procure any 
necessary fire insurance on the structure. (R. 144) 
The case came before the district court on competing motions 
for summary judgment. Based upon the modern trend of cases and 
public policy, Fullmer argued that he was a de facto co-insured of 
the landlord for purposes of subrogation, and that State Farm was 
not entitled to pursue a subrogation claim against him. 
Based upon these competing motions for summary judgment, the 
trial court dismissed State Farm' s claim against Brad Fullmer. (R. 
235) 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In addition to the statement of facts set forth by the 
appellant, the following facts were not disputed: 
1. At the time Brad Fullmer entered into the student housing 
agreement with The Wedge, he was a 20-year old college student. 
Brad Fullmer never understood from the agreement nor was he ever 
told by the owner or its representative that he would be required 
to purchase and carry property insurance insuring the structure and 
improvements in which he was going to reside. (Affidavit of Brad 
Fullmer, R. 144, 145) 
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2. The student housing agreement (R. 147) contains, among 
others, the following provisions: 
Rent: $335. 00 PER QUARTER. . . . No monthly 
payments! . . . 
3. . . . NO MEMBER OF OPPOSITE SEX IS 
ALLOWED IN THE BEDROOM, BATHROOM OR HALL 
AREAS! While there are no "dorm" hours, 
students are expected to leave and enter 
quietly after the 10: 00 p. m. quiet hour. . . 
9. From time to time, it may be necessary to 
move one or more tenants to another apartment 
to accommodate remodeling and to achieve 
maximum occupancy per unit. . . . 
16. Any tenant who has been given notice to 
vacate the premises by the Landlord for any 
reason whatsoever shall not be entitled to a 
refund of his or her deposit or rent. Names 
of all such persons shall be submitted to 
Dixie College as well as to their parents. It 
is the intent of the Landlord and their 
managers to keep The Wedge in superior 
condition. 
3. None of the tenants of The Wedge Apartments, including 
Brad Fullmer, were required by GNS or by the lease to provide 
insurance for damage to the apartments or their furnishings. (R. 
188). 
4. State Farm did not require that the tenants, including 
Brad Fullmer, furnish or provide their own insurance for any damage 
which the tenant might negligently cause to the subject property, 
including its contents or structure. (R. 188). 
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5. State Farm's "Apartment Policy" provides in part that 
(page 28): 
7. Subrogation. 
(a) . . . The insured shall do nothing 
after loss to prejudice such rights. 
(b) The Company shall not be bound to 
pay any loss if the insured has impaired any 
right or recovery for loss; however, it is 
agreed that the insured may: 
(1) as respects to property 
while on the premises of the insured 
release others in writing from 
liability for loss prior to loss, 
and such release shall not affect 
the right of the insured to recover 
hereunder; and . . . (R. 96) 
6. Subsequent to the fire, Brad Fullmer was relocated to 
another apartment by the owners. Brad and his roommates resided 
there until they were asked to leave for reasons unrelated to the 
fire. The plaintiffs made no assessment against defendant or his 
roommates as a result of the fire. (Affidavit of Brad Fullmer, R. 
208). 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court properly dismissed State Farm7 s claim for 
subrogation. Subrogation is not available against every negligent 
party. Insurance and subrogation revolve around risk, risk 
management and risk allocation. State Farm accepted the risk of 
loss in this case, and is not entitled to pass it on to the tenant, 
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Fullmer. The modern trend of cases and commentators recognize that 
in the absence of an express agreement in the lease to the 
contrary, that subrogation is not available to the landlord' s 
insurance carrier against a negligent tenant. The tenant stands in 
the shoes of the insured landlord for the limited purpose of 
defeating a subrogation claim. 
The modern trend of cases, including this Court' s decision in 
Fashion Place Inv. v. Salt Lake County, infra, are supported by 
many public policy factors. Those factors include the reasonable 
expectation in a modern urban setting that the landlord' s fire 
policy is for the benefit of both the landlord and the tenant, the 
general acceptance in the marketplace that the landlord' s policy is 
for the benefit of both the landlord and the tenant, the 
recognition that the rent paid by the tenant pays for the 
insurance, and the impracticality of requiring a tenant to purchase 
millions of dollars of fire coverage simply to be a dormitory (or 
apartment) dweller. 
The policy at issue gave the landlord the right to waive 
subrogation. Subrogation in this case would result in a windfall 
to State Farm, who set its rates not expecting to recover in 
subrogation. 
2. The trial court properly excluded portions of David 
Houston' s affidavit and admitted Brad Fullmer' s affidavit. The 
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portions of Mr. Houston7 s affidavit that were stricken were not 
based on personal knowledge. Based upon statements made by the 
court during the course of its ruling on the motions for summary 
judgment, the rulings regarding both affidavits, even if incorrect, 
were harmless error. 
3. The plaintiff s motion for summary judgment was properly 
denied. Even if this court should overturn the trial court' s 
decision on Fullmer's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment was properly denied. It was Fullmer's 
expectation that the landlord would provide fire insurance for his 
benefit. In addition, the conduct of the landlord and the tenant 
after the fire evidences their mutual understanding that the 
landlord' s insurance was for the benefit of both the landlord and 
the tenant. The landlord' s failure to require the tenant, in the 
lease, to provide insurance would require the court to add terms by 
implication to a contract prepared by the landlord. Summary 
judgment under these circumstances should not be determined 
adversely to Fullmer. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED STATE 
FARM' S CLAIM FOR SUBROGATION. 
It is clear that subrogation is not available against every 
negligent party. The Fashion Place Investments, Inc. v. Salt Lake 
County. 776 P. 2d 941 (Utah App. 1989); cert. den. 783 P. 2d 53 (Utah 
1989), Board of Education v. Hales. 566 P. 2d 1246 (Utah 1977), and 
Bonneville on the Hill Co. v. Sloane. 572 P. 2d 402 (Utah 1977) 
cases each refused to allow subrogation against negligent occupants 
or users of property. 
Fire loss is nearly always occasioned by negligence. The 
inherent nature of insurance is that it revolves around risk, risk 
management, and risk allocation. Board of Education v. Hales. 566 
P. 2d 1246, 1247 (Utah 1977). This case is not about negligence. 
This case is not about proximate cause. This case is about who 
bears the risk of loss under all of the circumstances which exist. 
The trial court properly allocated the loss which occurred to State 
Farm. 
It is "common experience" that a landlord keeps his premises 
insured against fire loss. Bonneville on the Hill Company v. 
Sloane. 572 P. 2d 402 at 404 (Utah 1977). In this case, the 
reasonable expectations or "common experience" of the parties -
i. e. - that the landlord would provide property insurance - should 
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be given great weight. Pickover v. Smith' s Management Corp. , 771 
P. 2d 664 at 668 (Utah 1989); Fashion Place Inv. v. Salt Lake 
County, 776 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1989). 
A frequently cited case addressing subrogation claims of the 
type presented in this action is Sutton v. Jondahl, 532 P. 2d 478 
(Okla. App. 1975). Sutton was cited favorably by this Court in 
Fashion Place, supra, at 944. In Sutton, a ten year old tenant 
performed a chemistry experiment which started a fire in the 
apartment. In the subrogation action brought against the tenant' s 
parents by the landlord' s insurance company, the court discussed 
the principle of subrogation as follows: 
Under the facts and circumstances in this 
record the subrogation should not be available 
to the insurance carrier because the law 
considers the tenant as a co-insured of the 
landlord absent an express agreement between 
them to the contrary, comparable to the 
permissive user feature of automobile 
insurance. This principle is derived from a 
recognition of a relational reality, namely, 
that both landlord and tenant have an 
insurable interest in the rented premises -
the former owns the fee and the latter has the 
possessory interest. Here the landlords 
(Suttons) purchased the fire insurance from 
Central Mutual Insurance Company to protect 
such interest in the property against loss 
from fire. This is not uncommon. And as a 
matter of sound business practice the premium 
paid had to be considered in establishing the 
rent rate on the rental unit. Such premium 
was chargeable against the rent as an overhead 
or operating expense. And of course it 
follows then that the tenant actually paid the 
premium as part of the monthly rental. 
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The landlords of course could have held out 
for an agreement that the tenant would furnish 
fire insurance on the premises. They did not. 
They elected to themselves purchase the 
coverage. To suggest the fire insurance does 
not extend to the insurable interest of an 
occupying tenant is to ignore the realities of 
urban apartment and single family dwelling 
renting. Prospective tenants ordinarily rely 
upon the owner of the dwelling to provide fire 
protection for the realty (as distinguished 
from personal property) absent an express 
agreement otherwise. Certainly it would not 
likely occur to a reasonably prudent tenant 
that the premises were without fire insurance 
protection or if there was such protection it 
did not inure to his benefit and that he would 
need to take out another fire policy to 
protect himself from any loss during his 
occupancy. Perhaps this comes about because 
the companies themselves have accepted 
coverage of a tenant as a natural thing. 
Otherwise their insurance salesmen would have 
long ago made such need a matter of common 
knowledge by promoting the sale to tenants of 
a second fire insurance policy to cover the 
real estate. 
Basic equity and fundamental justice upon 
which the equitable doctrine of subrogation is 
established requires that when fire insurance 
is provided for a dwelling it protects the 
insurable interest of all joint owners 
including the possessory interests of a tenant 
absent an express agreement bv the latter to 
the contrary. The company affording such 
coverage should not be allowed to shift the 
fire loss to an occupying tenant even if the 
latter negligently caused it. New Hampshire 
Insurance Co. v. Ballard Wade, Inc. , 17 Utah 
2d 786, 404 P. 2d 674 (1965). (at 482) 
(Emphasis added) 
The text, 6A Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, §4055 (1991 
Supp.), and the Neubauer v. Hostetter, 485 N.W. 2d 87 (Iowa 1992) 
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infra, case, authorities relied on by State Farm, recognize the 
Sutton opinion as reflective of the "modern trend" of decisions on 
the issue of residential landlord-tenant subrogation. Sutton, and 
other cases reaching similar conclusions, have articulated policy 
factors which support the conclusion that the tenant should be 
treated as a co-insured under the landlord' s policy absent an 
express provision to the contrary. These factors include: 
(a) It is the reasonable expectation of the parties to 
the residential lease that, without an express provision to the 
contrary, the landlord carries fire insurance for the benefit of 
both the landlord and the tenant. Cascade Trailer Corp. v. Beeson, 
749 P. 2d 761 (Wash. App. 1988); Sutton, supra, Bonneville on the 
Hill Company, supra. 
(b) It would be illogical for both the landlord and 
tenant to procure separate insurance policies on the same property 
interest. The landlord has an enormously greater interest to see 
that the apartments are insured. The Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized that all fire insurance is of the "property" type, and 
not the "liability" type. Board of Educ. v. Hales, supra at 1247. 
(c) As a matter of sound business practice, the premium 
paid by the landlord, GNS, for insurance had to be considered in 
establishing the rental rate of the unit, and in effect was paid by 
the tenant, Sutton v. Jondahl, 532 P. 2d at 482, supra. It would be 
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an "undue hardship" to require a tenant to obtain fire insurance 
when he is already paying for fire insurance on the premises 
through his rent. Rizzuto, supra, p. 6 90 . 
(d) GNS, in the dorm contract, could easily have 
required that Fullmer furnish fire insurance on the premises, but 
did not, Sutton, supra: Rizzuto, infra. 
(e) There is in most instances an enormous disparity in 
bargaining power with respect to apartment leases, and especially 
in this case involving a dorm contract with a tenant that even the 
landlord recognizes was a novice. (See language in "Guaranty" of 
the dorm contract, R. 148). The landlord could have unilaterally 
required the tenant to carry insurance, but did not. Sutton, 
supra. 
(f) It would not likely occur to a reasonably prudent 
tenant that the premises were without fire insurance protection, or 
that it did not inure to his benefit and that he would need to take 
out another fire policy, Sutton, supra at 482; Cascade Trailer 
Corp. v. Jim Beeson. et al. , 749 P. 2d 761 (Wash. 1988) rev. den. 
1988. Rizzuto v. Morris, 592 P. 2d 688 at 691 (Wash. App. 1979). 
In this case, Fullmer testified that he would never have 
anticipated that he needed to insure the premises. (R. 144, 145). 
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(g) Fire insurance companies have come to accept the 
concept of tenants being co-insureds. Rizzuto. supra, at 690. If 
not, it would be expected that they would be promoting the sale to 
tenants of a second fire insurance policy to cover the real estate, 
which apparently they are not. Sutton, supra at 482. If State 
Farm did not expect to include GNS' tenants, including Fullmer, in 
its policy, it should have removed from its policy the right of GNS 
to release their subrogation rights. (See policy, R. 96, para. 7). 
(h) Even State Farm assumed that it would not have 
subrogation rights. The Apartment Policy it issued gave the 
landlord the right to release State Farm' s subrogation rights, 
(Policy, p. 28 "Subrogation," R. 96) Thus, State Farm's premiums 
to the landlord were necessarily based on the assumption that State 
Farm' s subrogation rights would be released. Any subrogation 
recovery by State Farm would be a windfall. This court can safely 
assume, as the Utah Supreme Court recognized in Board of Education 
of Jordan School District v. Hales, 566 P. 2d 1246 (Utah 1977), that 
State Farm has, "after painstaking analysis [of losses because of 
fire . . . directly traced to some act or acts of negligence] . . 
. fixed its premium and issued its policy." (at 1247), and can 
further assume that this analysis "revolved around understanding 
and manipulating the concept of risk management, risk control, risk 
transference, risk distribution, risk retention, etc." (at 1247.) 
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State Farm has offered no evidence to suggest that the loss which 
occurred was not considered in setting its rates, or that the loss 
which occurred was of the type for which it expected to recover 
subrogation. 
(i) Denial of a right of subrogation in cases such as 
this, where there is no express provision in the lease requiring 
the tenant to provide insurance, will reduce costly litigation. 
Alaska Ins. Co. v. RCA Alaska Commun. , 623 P. 2d 1216, fn. 3 at p. 
1219 (Alaska 1981). 
(j) Denial of a right to subrogation prevents windfalls 
to insurers who have already assumed and been paid for the risk, 
avoids the cost to society of double insuring property, and places 
/here it was intended to be, on the landlord's insurance 
carrier who has collected premiums to cover the loss insured 
against. 
Perhaps the policy reasons for denying subrogation rights to 
apar^ ners' insurance companies, such as State Farm, and the 
po~ £ this litigation are best summarized in Robert Keeton' s 
^ext on Insurance Law (1971) where it is stated that: 
Probably it is undesirable, from the point of 
view of public interest, that the risk of loss 
from a fire negligently caused by a [tenant] 
be upon the [tenant] rather than the 
[landlord's] insurer. Allowing the 
[landlord's] insurer to proceed against the 
[tenant] is surely contrary to expectations of 
persons other than those who have been exposed 
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to this bit of law either during negotiations 
for a lease or else after a loss. 
This Court, in the Fashion Place, supra, case, cited favorably 
to Sutton and many of the other cases which reflect the "modern 
trend, " i.e. , that in the absence of language to the contrary in 
the lease, it is expected that the owner will procure fire 
insurance for the benefit of both the landlord and the tenant. 
In Fashion Place Investments, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, supra. 
Salt Lake County leased space from Fashion Place, The lease 
required the tenant to deliver up the premises at the end of the 
term in good condition, . . . "damage by fire and casualty not the 
fault of [Salt Lake County] . . . excepted therefrom." (at 943) 
(Emphasis added) The landlord was required by the lease to provide 
fire insurance on the building, which it did, but did not include 
the County as an "insured". The fire which resulted in the loss 
was caused by the negligence of county employees, and was the 
"fault" of Salt Lake County. Thus, in Fashion Place, this Court 
was faced with a subrogation action where the tenant and landlord 
had expressly agreed that the tenant would bear the loss resulting 
from the fire. 
If, as State Farm incorrectly asks this Court to assume, 
negligence or liability of the tenant is the controlling factor in 
a subrogation action, the Fashion Place case should have been 
decided against the tenant. Especially where the County (the 
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tenant) had agreed in the lease to be liable for fires it caused. 
But the result of the Fashion Place action was against the 
insurance company - this Court held that the insurer (Safeco) could 
not recover in subrogation against the County. 
An immaterial factual difference exists between the Fashion 
Place case and this action in that the lease in Fashion Place 
required the landlord to provide insurance. The lease in this case 
is silent as to who will provide insurance. This difference is 
immaterial, because as the Utah court recognized in Bonneville, and 
has been recognized in many other jurisdictions, Sutton, supra, in 
the absence of a contrary provision there is a presumed term in the 
lease that the landlord will provide insurance. Thus, in Fashion 
Place, the parties had simply placed in writing that which would 
have otherwise been presumed. This Court in Fashion Place found 
that where the landlord procured property insurance the tenant was 
a de facto coinsured, and held that "Safeco has no right to pursue 
a subrogation claim against [the tenant]." (at 945). By the same 
analysis, Brad Fullmer was a de facto coinsured of State Farm. 
An analysis of the various cases on the issue of tenant 
liability reveals an apparent line of demarcation. This line is 
determined by whether: 
(a) the jurisdiction (Utah included) adopts the premise 
that when the landlord purchases fire insurance it is for the 
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benefit of both the tenant and the landlord unless there is an 
express agreement to the contrary, (see Sutton, supra, and the 
discussion in Fashion Place Investment, supra, at 944 embracing 
Sutton and Rizzuto, infra); or 
(b) whether the state applies the rule that where the 
agreement is silent as to who will carry the insurance, each party 
is responsible to do so. See for example Accruisto v. Hahn, 619 
P. 2d 1237 (N. M. 1980) (a case relied on by State Farm at the trial 
level which has been overruled in C. R. Anthony Co. v. Loretto Mall 
Partners. 817 P. 2d 238 at 243 (N. M. 1991)) and Pace v. Scott, 567 
S. W. 2d 101 (Ark. 1978). 
This Court has specifically embraced the Sutton and Rizzuto 
rationale in Fashion Place. The Utah Supreme Court has rejected 
the reasoning of cases contrary to Sutton. (See, for example, 
Board of Educ. v. Hales, 566 P . 2d 1246 at 1247, and its agreement 
with the dissent in McBroome-Bennett Plbg. v. Villa France, 515 
S. W. 2d 32 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).) 
State Farm contends that Utah law allows subrogation against 
tenants except in three specific circumstances, relying upon Board 
of Education of Jordan School District v. Hales, 566 P. 2d 1246 
(Utah 1977); and Fashion Place Investment, Inc. v. Salt Lake 
County. 776 P. 2d 941 (Utah App. 1989); and Bonneville on the Hill 
Co. v. Sloane. 572 P. 2d 402 (Utah 1977) to identify those 
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circumstances. In each of those cases, subrogation was denied 
against a negligent defendant. However, none of the cases suggest 
that instances in which subrogation will be disallowed are limited 
to those particular circumstances . 
State Farm places considerable reliance upon a recent Iowa 
decision, Neubauer v. Hostetter, 485 N. W. 2d 87 (Iowa 1992), which 
specifically rejects this court's decision in Fashion Place. 
Neubauer relies extensively on a quote from the Appleman treatise 
which discusses the right of the insurer to decide who it will 
insure. This factor relied on in Neubauer is not applicable to 
State Farm7 s policy in this case, because State Farm gave its 
insured the right to waive State Farm' s subrogation rights. Thus, 
it was not State Farm who was to decide who it would insure. State 
Farm passed that right to GNS. GNS gave away State Farm' s 
subrogation right when it failed to require Fullmer to provide his 
own insurance. The result in the Fashion Place case also rejects 
Neubauer7 s reasoning. In Fashion Place, County was not a named co-
insured. The insurer in Fashion Place did not "decide" to insure 
Salt Lake County. Salt Lake County, like Fullmer, was a " de facto 
co-insured. " 
Neubauer rejects without elaboration the extensive policy 
discussion in Sutton that in modern urban circumstances it is 
presumed, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, 
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that the landlord will provide insurance on the premises for the 
benefit of both the landlord and tenant. Sutton recognizes the 
disparate bargaining power between landlords and tenants. The 
thinness of Neubauer' s reasoning is reflected in the statement 
that: "If the landlord had agreed to insure the tenant's interest 
in the property and failed to do so, the result might be different 
(p. 90)." Thus, even Neubauer turns upon the issue of whose 
obligation it is to provide fire insurance. 
Contrary to the Iowa case, in Utah there is a presumption in 
all leases, based on "common experience," that the landlord keeps 
the premises insured against fire loss. (Bonneville on the Hill 
C£h, supra, 572 P. 2d at 403-404.) As articulated in the Sutton, 
supra, case, a tenant is entitled to assume that the landlord' s 
insurance is for his benefit, unless stated otherwise in the lease. 
The presumption that insurance purchased by GNS was for the 
benefit of the tenant, unless expressly agreed otherwise, should be 
given even more emphasis in this particular case. The rental 
agreement at issue (R. 147, 148), while loosely referred to as a 
lease, is in reality a dorm contract. The dorm contract contains 
a provision for the parent' s guaranty (which was not signed in this 
case). The guaranty recognizes that the agreement may be the 
student's "first experience with tenant/landlord relationships." 
The dorm contract called for quarterly and not monthly rental. The 
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rooms were furnished and the tenant's conduct was subject to 
restrictive limitations which would not ordinarily be found in 
rental agreements. Paragraph 6 of the agreement indicates that no 
refunds of deposits will be made to tenants who have breached the 
rules and regulations. The landlord even had the right to move 
Fullmer from unit to unit - much like a hotel guest. In spite of 
all of these rules, and the disparate bargaining power, there is 
nothing in the dorm contract to suggest that the landlord would not 
be insuring the property for the benefit of all involved, or that 
the tenant should obtain separate fire insurance. 
The denial of subrogation to State Farm is consistent with 
prior Utah decisions, and consistent with the "modern trend" of 
cases. Sutton v. Jondahl, supra. Cascade Trailer Court v. Beeson, 
749 P. 2d 761 (Wash. App. 1988); Safeco Insurance Co. v. Weiscrerber, 
767 P. 2d 271 (Idaho 1989); Safeco Insurance Co. v. Capri, 705 P. 2d 
659 (Nev. 1985); Rizzuto v. Morris, 592 P. 2d 688 (1979); Alaska 
Insurance Co. v. RCA Alaskan Communications, Inc. , 623 P. 2d 1216 
(Alaska 1981); Fashion Place Inv. v. Salt Lake County, 776 P. 2d 944 
(Utah App. 1989), cert. den. 783 P. 2d 53 (Utah 1989); Continental 
Insurance v. Bottomly, 817 P. 2d 1162 (Mont. 1991); Fireman7 s 
Insurance Co. v. Wheeler. 566 N. Y. S. 2d 692 (1991); Keeton. Basic 
Text on Insurance Law, §4. 4b (1971). 
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In Cascade Trailer Corp. v. Beeson, 749 P. 2d 761 (Wash. App. 
1988) three men rented a dwelling unit from Cascade. A fire was 
started by one of the tenants when he left a pan of grease 
unattended on an electric stove. The lease required the tenants to 
redeliver the premises in good condition. The owner' s insurance 
company paid the loss and brought a subrogation action against the 
tenant. The issue presented for resolution by the court was 
whether the tenants ". . . [were] implied co-insureds under 
Cascade' s fire insurance policy, thus defeating the insured' s right 
of subrogation against them?" (at 762) The Washington Appellate 
Court analyzed many of the cases which have addressed the issue, 
including the public policy issues which they presented and ruled 
in favor of the tenant stating (at 766): 
Whether rent covers all of the landlord' s 
expenses, including insurance premiums 
[referring to Sutton] is not the critical 
question. Rather, the issue concerns the 
party' s reasonable expectations. Where the 
landlord has secured fire insurance covering 
the leased premises, the tenant can reasonably 
expect the insurance to cover him as well, 
unless the parties have specifically agreed 
otherwise. Why? - because the tenant is in 
privity of contract with the landlord, and he 
has a property interest in the premises the 
insurance protects. 
The court concluded: 
We adopt the reasonable expectations rationale 
of the Sutton line of cases and hold Cascade 
is presumed to carry its insurance for the 
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tenant lefit because the lease did not 
contain _i express provision to the contrary. 
(a. 
A& _s true in this case, there was no requirement in the 
rental agreement in Cascade that required either the landlord or 
the tenant to provide insurance. 
In Safeco Insurance Companies v. Weisaerber, 767 P. 2d 271 
iho 1989), Safeco brought a subrogation action to recover 
^mounts which it had paid on account of a fire caused by the 
negligence of a tenant in a rental home. On competing motions for 
summary judgment, the trial court ruled in favor of the tenant. 
The tenant testified that he did not obtain fire insurance on the 
real property because the landlord never requested that he do so 
and he did not feel it was his responsibility. The Idaho Court 
rejected _ .e notion that the tenant should be liable and stated: 
denial of a right to subrogation in this 
instance prevents windfalls to insurers, 
prevents the double-insuring of property and 
places r.-.e risk where it was intended to be, 
on the landlord1 s insurance carrier which has 
collected premiums to cover the loss insured 
against. " (at 274) 
In Safeco Insurance Company v. Capri, 705 P. 2d 659 (Nev. 1985) 
Safeco brought an action against a tenant who negligently caused a 
fire that burned down a rental property. The Nevada Supreme Court 
relied on many of the cases already discussed and made the 
following separate observations: 
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It is not uncommon for the lessor to provide 
fire insurance on the leased property. As a 
matter of sound business practice, the premium 
to be paid had to be considered in 
establishing the rental rate. (661) . . . 
Moreover, insurance companies expect to pay 
their insureds for negligently caused fires 
and adjust their rates accordingly. In this 
context, an insurer should not be allowed to 
treat a tenant, who is in privity with the 
insured landlord, as a negligent third party 
when it could not collect against its own 
insured had the insured negligently caused the 
fire. (661) 
The Rizzuto fRizzuto v. Morris, 592 P.2d 688 
(Wash. Ap. 1979)] court concluded that if the 
[landlord] did not expect to cover the 
[tenant] under the policy, then they should 
have expressly notified the [tenant] of the 
need for a second policy to cover its 
interest. "Since they failed to do so, they 
have no cause of action against the lessee for 
the fire damage, and the insurance company has 
no right of subrogation." (661) 
In Continental Insurance Co. v. Bottomlv. 817 P. 2d 1162 (Mont. 
1991) the Montana Supreme Court adopted the rationale in Sutton and 
refused a subrogation claim arising out of a cabin fire. The fire 
was caused by the owner' s brother who was a regular user, but not 
an owner, of the cabin. The Montana court focused particularly 
upon the discussion from Sutton that "subrogation is a fluid 
concept depending upon the particular facts and circumstances of a 
given case for its applicability. To some facts subrogation will 
adhere - to others it will not. " 
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In Iowa National Insurance v. Boatricrht, 516 P. 2d 439 (Colo. 
1973) the court rejected a subrogation claim against a father who 
negligently started a fire in his daughter' s home. 
State Farm attempts to argue that reasonable expectations of 
the parties to the lease should play no role in the outcome of this 
litigation. (State Farm Memorandum, p. 25). The Allen v. 
Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance. 839 P. 2d 798 (Utah 1992) 
case relied upon by State Farm addresses the issue of "reasonable 
expectations" in a very limited context where the express language 
in the insurance contract was contrary to what the insured claimed 
were her "reasonable expectations". In this case, the lease is 
silent on the issue of insurance. The Allen case has no factual 
relationship to this case. 
The law generally is that a contract includes those items 
which were understood by or obvious to the parties in the 
circumstances of the agreement. This is especially true in this 
case where the contract is not integrated, and is silent on the 
issue of insurance. 17 A Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts §379. Fullmei 
testified that he did not understand he could have been required tc 
obtain separate insurance, to insure the structure, and that h€ 
would have expected the owner to have his own insurance. (R. 144, 
156). The owner did not testify that he had any different 
expectation. Under these circumstances, an implied term of the 
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lease was that the landlord would provide fire insurance for the 
benefit of the tenant and the landlord. 
This court should also consider the interpretation of the 
lease given to it by the parties. Bullfrog Marina. Inc. v. Lentz, 
501 P. 2d 266 (Ut. 1972). It is not the landlord that is pressing 
this case. It is the insurer. The landlord did not evict Fullmer 
because of the fire. The landlord did not attempt to recover any 
damages from Fullmer or his roommates based upon any language in 
the lease. No assessment was made by the landlord. It is clear 
from both the landlord and the tenant' s conduct that they expected 
the landlord' s insurer to repair the property in exchange for the 
premiums it had received. The conduct of both the landlord and 
tenant clearly evidences an understanding by them that the landlord 
was providing fire insurance on the property for their mutual 
benefit. 
State Farm has attempted on several occasions in their brief 
(pages 24 and 22) to interject facts about whether or not Fullmer 
has coverage through his parents' homeowners policy. The only 
possible reason for State Farm to include this discussion is to 
affect the court' s decision on the issue of liability. Rule 411 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence would expressly exclude this type of 
evidence at trial. This discussion should not be considered by 
this court on the issue of liability. Even if it is considered, 
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there is no evidence to support the conclusion that even if 
Fullmer7 s parents had insurance, that it would cover the loss at 
issue, or what the limit of Fullmer' s parents' policy was. 
State Farm' s argument raises a more disturbing public policy 
factor. The policy issued by State Farm insured the premises for 
$1. 5 million. (R. 229) Even if Fullmer was required to obtain a 
tenant' s policy, the policy would have had to have insured Fullmer 
for $1. 5 million if it were to protect him from fire loss to the 
property. (The whole project could have burned. ) And what about 
the family that has two children at college, each living in a large 
dormitory or apartment complex worth tens of millions of dollars. 
If State Farm' s argument is adopted, that family would have to 
procure liability insurance with a face value of tens of millions 
of dollars. While insurance companies would no doubt enjoy the 
premium income from such policies, as a matter of public policy, it 
is far more reasonable for the insurer of the apartment or 
dormitory property to include the conduct of tenants in its 
evaluation of risks and in establishing premiums, thus placing the 
cost of insuring the risk upon the landlord, who then is in a 
position to pass it on to the tenant in a pro rata manner. 
In any event, State Farm's attempt to interject this issue 
ignores the fact that it was the landlord' s obligation to provide 
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fire insurance for the benefit of both parties, absent express 
language in the lease to the contrary. 
The case of U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty v. Let1 s Frame It, 75 9 
P. 2d 819 (Colo. App. 1988) (page 14 of State Farm's brief) is 
distinguishable on several bases. The most important of these is 
the specific requirement in the lease that the tenant maintain 
insurance, thus negating any implication that the landlord' s 
insurance was for the benefit of both the landlord and the tenant. 
On numerous occasions through its brief, State Farm misstates 
Sutton' s holding as being that "a tenant is a co-insured simply 
because he is a tenant." (Page 21) Sutton' s holding is actually 
much narrower, to wit, "that in the absence of an express agreement 
between [the landlord and tenant] to the contrary • . . ". (532 P. 2d 
at 482) the tenant is an implied co-insured. State Farm then 
argues that as a practical matter the chances that such language 
would be included in the lease are "almost nill". This contention 
ignores reality. It is the landlord that prepares the lease and 
can place the language in the lease. It is the insurance company 
that can require the landlord to put the language in the lease. 
The insurance company can do this by eliminating the exceptions to 
subrogation in the policies. This court must assume that there is 
some competitive advantage to State Farm to issue policies which 
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allow landlords to waive subrogation rights and which do not force 
landlords to require tenants to obtain their own insurance. 
Public policy should require that a tenant be affirmatively 
placed on notice in the lease of the need to obtain fire insurance 
to overcome the "reasonable expectation" that the landlord is 
obtaining insurance for their mutual benefit. In the absence of 
such notice or requirement in the lease, subrogation should be 
denied. 
State Farm argues that to not find Fullmer ultimately liable 
in this case turns traditional tort law upside down. (Page 21) 
Indeed, insurance does, to a large extent, turn tort law upside 
down. Insurance protects people against negligence, even their own 
negligence. Insurance is a device used to allocate risk. 
Insurance is a device which allows parties to plan their affairs. 
Subrogation is but a narrow aspect of insurance. The wide factual 
variation in the cases which have applied and adopted Sutton 
emphasize the critical role that policy factors and the expectation 
of the parties have played in the determination of subrogation 
rights. 
At the outset of this brief, Fullmer observed that this case 
is not about negligence or proximate cause, but is about allocation 
of risk. The district court' s decision places the risk in this 
case exactly where it belongs, upon the insurance company that 
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established and accepted premiums, which were determined after 
consideration of all risks and in light of the landlord' s right to 
give up the company' s subrogation rights, to insure the premises 
against fire, and not on a 20-year old dorm resident. The district 
court' s decision places the burden upon the landlord, who is in the 
position to expressly require the tenant in the lease to obtain 
insurance if the tenant was expected to do so. The district 
court' s decision advances what Robert Keeton, supra, and the modern 
trend of cases calls the "reasonable expectations" of the parties. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT RULED PROPERLY WITH RESPECT TO 
THE AFFIDAVITS OF BRAD FULLMER AND DAVID 
HOUSTON. 
(a) David Houston Affidavit. Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure provides that "supporting or opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that 
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. " 
In addition, they must set forth "specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial." 
Mr. Houston's affidavit (R. 217) states that he was a claims 
superintendent for State Farm for five years. The affidavit goes 
on to make additional statements, some of which were stricken by 
the trial court. In particular, the trial court struck Mr. 
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Houston' s testimony in paragraph 5 and 6 discussing his belief 
regarding homeowner' s policies coverage and children living away 
from home and tenant policies. 
The trial court' s ruling striking those paragraphs was correct 
for several reasons- Houston does not set forth any personal 
knowledge regarding the Prudential policy which the stricken 
paragraphs purport to address or the extent of its coverage. The 
affidavit does not provide any foundation to support a conclusion 
that Houston has any knowledge of policies issued by any company 
other than State Farm. The affidavit does not state that Houston 
has any background in underwriting, or any experience except in 
claims. Houston' s affidavit is not responsive to the issue of the 
reasonable expectation of the parties to the rental agreement. Mr. 
Houston' s affidavit does not address the limits of coverage 
available in a tenant policy. Mr. Houston' s affidavit does not 
address State Farm' s underwriting practices, the factors State Farm 
considered in setting the premium for the apartments, and most 
curiously, whether or not State Farm expected that subrogation 
would be available at the time it wrote the policy and set its 
rates. The affidavit is not responsive to the proposition that in 
modern urban dwelling, it is presumed that the apartment owner will 
procure insurance for the benefit of both the owner and the tenant. 
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In summary, the stricken portions of the affidavit were not 
based on personal knowledge and were not relevant to the issues 
before the court. 
State Farm has the burden to show that, in addition to the 
trial court's ruling being in error, that there is a "reasonable 
likelihood" that if the ruling had been otherwise there would have 
been a different result. Redevelopment Aacv. v. Mitsui Inv. . Inc. , 
522 P. 2d 1370 (Utah 1974). 
For all of these reasons, the court' s ruling striking 
paragraphs 5 and 6 was correct because the affidavit was not 
relevant to any issue regarding liability and was not based on 
personal knowledge. If the court erred, it was in allowing any 
part of the affidavit to be received. At a minimum, any error was 
harmless error. Rule 61, U. R. C. P. 
(b) Fullmer Affidavit. State Farm argues that Fullmer' s 
Affidavit was based on hindsight, and as such, must be stricken. 
Initially, the trial court stated that the affidavit did not affect 
its decision. Therefore, any error in the trial court' s ruling is 
harmless error. Rule 61, U. R. C. P. 
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that relevant 
evidence means evidence having a tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
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evidence. It is not disputed in this action that insurance was not 
discussed at the time the lease was entered into and was not 
covered in the lease. Fullmer' s statements about what he would 
have expected (R. 144, 145) are relevant to the issue of the 
reasonable expectation of the parties. As discussed previously, 
the reasonable expectations of parties to a contract, as well as 
their conduct in relation to the contract, are factors to be 
considered in construing obligations arising under the contract. 
In the context of plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Fullmer' s Affidavit was probative of the issue of whether or not 
there was an implied agreement that the landlord would provide 
insurance on the property for the type of loss which occurred. Any 
contrary conclusion by the trial court would have required that 
court to ignore both the "general understanding in modern urban 
settings that the landlord provides property coverage" (Sutton) and 
Fullmer' s understanding. 
Fullmer' s testimony may also be viewed as opinion testimony by 
a lay witness. Mr. Fullmer was a renter. The testimony is 
rationally based on his perception of the obligations of the 
landlord and tenant and is helpful to the determination of a fact 
in issue, to wit, the obligation of the landlord to provide 
insurance coverage for the benefit of both the landlord and the 
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tenant in the absence of an express contractual provision to the 
contrary. 
The Webster v. Sill. 675 P. 2d 1170 (Utah 1983) decision 
relied on by State Farm is inapposite. Webster dealt with a 
situation where an affiant attempted to contradict his earlier 
deposition testimony. Allen v. Prudential Property & Casualty 
Insurance Co. , 839 P. 2d 798 (Utah 1992) is also inapposite. In 
Allen, the reasonable expectation doctrine was rejected because the 
insurance agreement contained express language contrary to what the 
insured claimed was her reasonable expectation. In this case, the 
lease was silent on the issue of insurance. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the "reasonable 
expectations doctrine is one in equity to protect against 
misapplying existing equitable doctrines. " Allen, supra, p. 806. 
The application of the "reasonable expectations doctrine" to this 
subrogation action is appropriate. 
For all of these reasons, Fullmer7 s affidavit was properly 
received. 
Ill 
PLAINTIFF' S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS 
PROPERLY DENIED. 
It is Fullmer' s position that pursuant to 
a) an assumption based on common experience (Bonneville 
on the Hill, supra, at 404), and 
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b) the rule of construction approved of in Sutton and 
Rizzuto, supra, (and embraced in Fashion Place), that in the 
absence of a writing to the contrary, the landlord is obligated to 
provide fire insurance on the property for the benefit of both the 
landlord and the tenant. 
State Farm' s motion was based upon the premise that there was 
no factual issue about who was to provide fire insurance. Fullmer 
agreed — there was no factual issue that the landlord was 
obligated to provide insurance for the benefit of both. 
In its motion for summary judgment, State Farm asked the court 
to determine as a matter of law that Fullmer was not covered by the 
landlord' s fire insurance. To rule in favor of State Farm, the 
court would have had to ignore the "reasonable expectations" 
(including Fullmer' s affidavit) or the assumption based on common 
experience that the landlord' s fire policy covered fire loss caused 
by Fullmer. The conduct of the parties before and after the fire, 
as discussed previously at p. 25-26, at a minimum, creates issues 
which preclude summary judgment against Fullmer. Fashion Place 
Inv. Ltd. v. Salt Lake County, supra. 
In its motion for summary judgment, State Farm was asking the 
court to imply a term in the dorm contract requiring Fullmer to 
provide fire insurance. The landlord drafted the lease and it 
should be construed against the landlord. Neither this court nor 
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the trial court should not be adding implied terms to the lease 
favorable to the drafter in summary judgment proceedings. Amoco 
Production v. Lindlev. 609 P. 2d 733 at 745 (Okla. 1980). 
Fullmer' s affidavit, the reasonable expectation of the 
parties, the conduct of the parties, and the absence of language in 
the lease would have to be considered in a light most favorable to 
Fullmer, and at a minimum, would create issues of fact precluding 
summary judgment in favor of State Farm. 
State Farm' s motion asserted that the landlords could have 
reasonably expected that the homeowner' s insurance on Fullmer' s 
parents' permanent residence would provide liability coverage for 
fire damage caused by Fullmer' s negligence. The landlords never 
stated this by affidavit or otherwise and there is no factual basis 
to support this position. In fact, the landlords did not require 
insurance or evidence of insurance by the tenant as a condition of 
occupancy. 
State Farm' s assertion, through Houston' s affidavit, that 
State Farm understood Fullmer had liability coverage through a 
separate homeowner' s policy, as discussed previously, is directly 
contrary to Rule 411 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, and should not 
be considered by the court in determining liability. Robinson v. 
Hreinson, 409 P. 2d 121 (Utah 1965). Furthermore, State Farm's 
understanding after the fact has nothing to do with the reasonable 
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expectations of the parties (GNS and Fullmer) at the time the lease 
was signed. 
For these reasons, summary judgment in favor of State Farm was 
properly refused, 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this court should affirm the 
judgment of the district court dismissing the Complaint. 
DATED this day of March, 1993. 
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